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Abstract
This paper argues that biometric verification evaluations
can obscure vulnerabilities that increase the chances that
an attacker could be falsely accepted. This can occur be-
cause existing evaluations implicitly assume that an im-
poster claiming a false identity would claim a random iden-
tity rather than consciously selecting a target to imperson-
ate. This paper shows how an attacker can select a tar-
get with a similar biometric signature in order to increase
their chances of false acceptance. It demonstrates this ef-
fect using a publicly available iris recognition algorithm.
The evaluation shows that the system can be vulnerable to
attackers targeting subjects who are enrolled with a smaller
section of iris due to occlusion. The evaluation shows how
the traditional DET curve analysis conceals this vulnerabil-
ity. As a result, traditional analysis underestimates the im-
portance of an existing score normalisation method for ad-
dressing occlusion. The paper concludes by evaluating how
the targeted false acceptance rate increases with the num-
ber of available targets. Consistent with a previous investi-
gation of targeted face verification performance, the exper-
iment shows that the false acceptance rate can be modelled
using the traditional FAR measure with an additional term
that is proportional to the logarithm of the number of avail-
able targets.
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of bio-
metric verification. Verification occurs when a user claims
an identity which is then validated by comparing a stored
biometric signature against their presented biometric fea-
tures. Whilst no verification process is infallible, significant
progress has been made in improving verification accuracy
and there are now many commercial biometric systems in
regular use. However, recent research[18] has shown how
these systems may be vulnerable to deliberate attempts to
subvert them.
This paper describes ’targeted biometric impersonation’.
Targeted attacks involve finding an existing person with a
similar biometric signature and then fraudulently assuming
that identity to spoof a verification check. Traditionally, the
security of biometric verification has been measured using
false acceptance rates. This measurement provides an es-
timate of the likelihood that an imposter would success-
fully be accepted by a biometric system if they randomly
claimed a false identity. However, it does not accurately
measure the vulnerability of such systems to more deliber-
ate attacks. This paper focuses on targeted attacks applied
to an iris verification algorithm to highlight how existing
evaluation methods obscure system vulnerabilities. By de-
liberately selecting a legitimate user with similar biometric
features, new weaknesses in the underlying biometric sys-
tem can be revealed and used to increase the false accep-
tance rate of any imposter. Targeted attacks are a signifi-
cant vulnerability as they have no artifical traits that can be
recognised, either by an automated system or a human su-
pervisor. They are also possible without control over the
enrolment procedure or the need for a confederate whose
true identity would be made known.
For the targeted attacks described in this paper, an im-
poster requires access to a copy of the biometric system be-
ing subverted and the enrollment information of users. This
makes the attack of greatest concern for high risk applica-
tions where attackers are more likely to be sophisticated and
well resourced. However, increases in the use of social net-
working, online dating and centralised biometric databases
have made identity systems more vulnerable to targeted at-
tacks. These large searchable collections of face and other
biometric data increase the chance of finding a target who
has a closely matching biometric signature. Such attacks are
particularly dangerous as they can be effective both against
automated biometrics and manual methods of identification,
such as visual passport inspection. The assasination of Al-
Mabhouh, a co-founder of the military wing of Hamas, in
2010 highlights this issues as it appears to have been an ex-
ample of a sophisticated targeted attack. There are currently
27 suspects wanted by Interpol for this assassination. They
entered Dubai with stolen identity information and passed
through multiple passport control processes without detec-
tion. If biometric systems are to prevent such attacks in fu-
ture they need to be made robust to targeted impersonation.
The paper starts by surveying the existing literature on
the measurement of biometric vulnerabilities. It then exam-
ines the effect of targeted impersonation on an iris verifi-
cation system. The investigation uses a publicly available
biometric algorithm and dataset to provide an estimate of
how targeted attacks can reduce a biometric system’s re-
liability. The paper then examines how the effectiveness
of attacks increases with the number of potential targets.
The paper concludes by proposing an improved false ac-
ceptance metric for verification performance. The paper’s
main contributions are the first investigation of the effects
of targeted attacks on iris verification. This paper demon-
strates the first use of targeted impersonation to identify spe-
cific system vulnerabilities that are concealed by traditional
evaluations. Targeted attack analysis also provides a more
accurate assesment of the importance of countermeasures
to such vulnerabilities. The paper also verifies that a previ-
ous logarithmic model for the increase in false acceptance
rate with number of subjects can also be applied to iris bio-
metrics, further supporting its use as an improved metric
for verification performance and as a possible model for the
natural variation in biometric features.
2. Background
All biometric systems require some form of evaluation to
assess their performance. Three approaches are identified in
the literature:
• Technology evaluation, which tests computer algo-
rithms against a database of previously obtained bio-
metric data using an algorithm-independent sensor
• Scenario evaluation, which uses volunteers to test a
system placed within a controlled environment mod-
eled on a proposed application
• Operational evaluation, which attempts to analyse per-
formance of biometric systems placed in real applica-
tions
Technology evaluations primarily measure verification
performance using the false rejection and false accep-
tance rates of the system under test with different tradeoff
priorities[4]. Technology evaluations are most commonly
used because they are relatively straightforward to perform,
particularly for the comparison of new and existing algo-
rithms. Note, however, that evaluation in such an environ-
ment does not necessarily provide an accurate estimate of
reliability when the biometric systems are deployed. For ex-
ample, the relative distribution of subjects within the eval-
uation data may not be representative of real applications.
In particular, most academic evaluation datasets consist of
students and staff within engineering departments. Such
datasets may also have been collected to maximise diver-
sity and thus represent more dissimilar subjects than would
occur in a typical deployment[10].
Many contextual factors can also have a significant ef-
fect on verification performance and, as the various biomet-
rics have matured, these factors have been investigated. For
example, within face recognition, the impact of image reso-
lution, facial pose, lighting, focus, occlusion, facial expres-
sion and aging have all been studied[20]. Recent biometric
evaluations have started to assess many of these factors.
More recently, deliberate attempts to attack biometric
systems have been investigated. Ratha et al.[17] have iden-
tified eight different types of attack based on the part of the
biometric system being subverted. Attacks from Type 1 are
aimed at the sensor and are the focus of this paper. The
remaining types are attacks on the electronic systems and
enrolment procedures used to setup and perform verifica-
tion.
In terms of sensor level attacks, three existing methods
have been identified[8]:
• Zero effort attacks, in which a person claims a random
identity and attempts to be incorrectly accepted by the
system. Zero effort attacks are the attack type being
measured in existing large scale performance evalua-
tions that calculate false accept rates.
• Brute force attacks, which repeatedly attempt to access
a system, adjusting a biometric feature until a suffi-
ciently close match is obtained[13]. Such attacks gen-
erally require unrestricted access to the biometric sys-
tem as is possible, for example, when picking a bio-
metric lock on a stolen laptop. Secure access control
scenarios, such as passport control at an airport, make
such attacks less feasible as access failures can alert
security.
• Artifact attacks, which use a synthetic biometric fea-
ture that has been produced from a genuine user. Such
attacks would also cover the attempted use of a surgi-
cally removed biometric features and methods which
exploit residual features on a sensor[16].
An additional consideration is that not all the users of a
system will necesarily have the same level of security. This
was highlighted by Doddington et al.[7], who measured the
relative recognisability of different users of a speaker recog-
nition system. Doddington et al. classified users into four
different types: sheep who have normal performance, goats
who are difficult to recognise, lambs who are easy to imper-
sonate and wolves who can easily impersonate others. At-
tackers can exploit this variation to compromise a biomet-
ric system. For example, a lamb insertion attack[8] would
involve deliberately enrolling a person or synthetic feature
that is known to have a similar signature to many subjects.
The system containing the lamb subject would then be vul-
nerable to imposters claiming the lamb identity.
The effect of targeted attacks has been studied for both
face[3] and gait verification systems[9]. In the case of
gait verification the attack was used with another imperson-
ation method to create the first successful spoofing attempt
against that biometric. The second evaluation examined the
effect of targeted attacks on forensic face verfication, this
evaluation showed that the increase in false acceptance rate
due to the increasing number of available targets could be
modelled with a logathimic curve. This resulted in a new
targeted false acceptance rate measure of biometric verifica-
tion performance which combined the baseline false accep-
tance rate with a logarithmic term for the effect of targeting.
3. Baseline Targeting Performance
This section evaluates the effects of targeted attacks on
a baseline iris biometric system. The evaluation is per-
formed using a publicly available algorithm and database.
The evaluations assume the attacker has complete access to
the gallery of subjects and the verification algorithm used
by the system. Half of the recordings of each subject are
randomly selected and used as the gallery to which the at-
tacker has access. Each subject in the gallery takes the role
of an attacker. The gallery data is analysed to select a target
that the attacker will impersonate. The non-gallery record-
ings of the target are then compared against the attacker to
determine imposter scores. Score values are also calculated
for all the true matching pairs of users of the system. These
score values are used to produce DET curves showing the
tradeoff of false accept and false reject rates for different
verification thresholds. A traditional zero-effort DET curve
is also produced to show the relative effect of targeted at-
tacks. The curve is calculated by comparing each of the
excluded recordings against each of the gallery recordings
to produce a range of scores for both legitimate and zero-
effort attacks. In all of the targeted attacks, a target was
chosen based on the best score value of all of the possible
combinations of attacker and target recordings within the
gallery. For each experiment it is expected that real deploy-
ments may have more challenging input data and in turn
may have more sophisticated verification systems; however,
the experiments show that the relative effect of targeting is
sufficient to warrant further investigation.
The iris baseline measurements are presented in figure
1. They have been obtained using the system created by
Libor Masek[14], which is an open source implementation
of an iris recognition system created by John Daugman[5].
The analysis was performed using the Casia-IrisV3-Interval
subset of the CasiaV3 dataset. The dataset consists of a
collection of controlled, high quality recordings of 249 sub-
jects. The comparisons were performed using the Hamming
distance measure with a maximum of 10 orientational shifts
and 3 radial shifts, which are the same constants used by the
open source VASIR iris recognition system[11].
The traditional DET iris evaluation has an equal error
rate (EER) of 11%. However, at the same threshold the tar-
geted attack scores have a much greater false accept rate
of 75%. A close inspection of the target selection re-
vealed that one subject was being targeted by all candi-
dates. This subject had a much higher than average es-
timation of occlusion, reducing the discriminative power
of the iris signature and thus acting in a manner similar
to a lamb insertion attack. More recent work by John
Daugman[6] has identified a score normalisation technique
to address the problem of matching subjects with vary-
ing amounts of occlusion. This technique treats a sig-
nature matching operation as being equivalent to a set of
Bernoulli trials. Under this assumption a normalisation
scale of HDnorm = 0.5− (0.5−HDraw)
√
n
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ensures
that all subjects should have the same False Rejection Rate
for a given verification threshold regardless of occlusion
percentage. As can be seen from figure 1 when this tech-
nique is applied it has very little effect on the EER of the
traditional evaluation. However, when the new system is
subjected to targeted attacks there is a significant improve-
ment from 75% to 31% FAR. This shows how important it
is to evaluate systems using targeted attacks as traditional
DET curve evaluations obscure vulnerabilities and under-
estimate the importance of countermeasures, such as score
normalisation.
3.1. Number of targets
In the baseline experiments the number of targets avail-
able to the attacker is necessarily restricted by the size of
the dataset. The size of the dataset is consistent with the
number of subjects that might access a secure office envi-
ronment but are much lower than many important identity
scenarios such as passport control. To analyse the effect of
increasing target numbers, experiments were performed us-
ing gallery subsets of increasing size. These subsets were
used in the selection of targets for evaluation. To minimise
any potential bias caused by subset selection, for a given
size, all non-overlapping subsets within the first 249 sub-
jects were combined to produce average false accept rates
across the different subsets. This ensures that a subset size
of 1 is virtually identical to the baseline performance. All
gallery members took the role of attackers using the subset
to generate the imposter scores. Figure 2 indicates how the
false accept rate increases as the size of the target subset
increases. The graph shows the false acceptance rate for a
threshold that achieves the equal error rate of the baseline
system under zero effort attacks. This is a plausible thresh-
Figure 1. The effects of a targeted attack on Libor Masek’s iris ver-
ification algorithm tested with the Casia-IrisV3-Interval dataset.
The curve labelled orig shows the performance of the system when
a zero effort attack is performed. The curve labelled torig shows
how the false acceptance rates increase when targeted biometric
attacks are performed. The curves labelled norm and tnorm show
the performance of the baseline and targeted evaluations when the
score normalisation has been applied.
old for systems that are unaware of the risks of targeted
attacks. As the number of available targets are increased,
the number of possible subsets decreases, raising the error
in the measured false acceptance rate. Much of the curve,
however, conforms reasonably well to a least squares fit of
an a.log(x) + b model, with a = 3.8 and b = 10.5. This
logarithmic model is consistent with the pattern found in a
previous investigation of face verification performance. It
suggests that a logarithmic model captures the natural like-
lihood of similarity in human features. The fitted model can
be used to provide estimates of the number of targets needed
to achieve different false accept rates. For example, using
this model, approximately 5.7 million targets are required
for a 70% FAR, 78 million for 80% and 1 billion for 90%.
Larger evaluations are needed to confirm these predictions.
Figure 3 compares the quality of the model fitting for
both the baseline system and the system with score nor-
malisation. Because of the presence of the lamb occluded
subject in the baseline system, large step increases in FAR
occur when the subject is included in the target list under-
mining the quality of the logarithmic fit. To evaluate the
quality of the logarithmic model, the autocorrelation func-
tion of the residuals were calculated. These results can be
seen in Figure 4. If the model is correctly capturing the be-
haviour of the function, the residuals of the fit should be
uncorrelated, resulting in an autocorrelation function with a
single large spike at 0. With only 250 samples it is still plau-
sible that correlations will appear in a random noise func-
tion, however it does appear that the logarithmic model fits
the face experiments slightly better than the iris ones. The
logarithmic model applied to the 250 samples has an R2
value of 0.983, a high value relative to linear or quadratic
fittings which produce values of 0.757 and 0.892 respec-
tively. However, it should be noted that such metrics have
their limitations[15]. One explanation for the logarithmic
effect comes from the central limit theorem. If biometric
signatures are formed as a combination of many small ran-
dom factors their underlying overall distribution amongst a
population is likely to form a multivariate Gaussian. Un-
der such circumstances a small percentage of attackers will
have unlikely signatures and thus will require exponentially
more targets to find a suitable subject to impersonate.
The precision of the target selection is also a factor in
how effective an attack will be. Figure 5 shows how the
false acceptance rate is reduced as noise is introduced into
the match scores used for target selection. This is intended
to simulate the effects of using a different verification algo-
rithm or impaired gallery data for target selection purposes.
The graph shows that the unnormalised baseline attacks be-
come rapidly less effective as the target selection noise in-
creases. This sensitivity is likely due to the single lamb sub-
ject contributing so heavily to the large baseline false accep-
tance rate. If this subject is not identified the FAR increase
is lost. The normalisation function includes a constant in-
tended to ensure that the average degree of iris occlusion
results in no change to the threshold scores, thus enabling
their comparison with the same level of noise. The nor-
malised results have a much lower initial FAR, however, it
is reduced much more slowly suggesting that each attacker
has more potentially viable targets to select from and thus
that there is a tradeoff in the benefits of using normalisation.
An additional consideration is how easily attackers can
obtain information about the gallery subjects and the system
being attacked. For small scale deployments, surveilance
may be sufficient to establish possible targets. However,
some biometrics will be much more vulnerable to targeted
attacks than others. For example, face, voice and gait are
relatively easy to record at a distance while fingerprint, iris
and finger vein may require more elaborate social engineer-
ing to obtain. For identity applications with a large number
of users, such as passports or driving licenses, public infor-
mation may be sufficient. For example, a number of on-
line dating websites have photographs of millions of users
which can be anonymously searched using soft biometric
constraints including, age, sex, race, hair colour and height
[1]. Such information is primarily applicable for face veri-
fication attacks. However, as the resolution of digital pho-
tographs increases it may eventually become possible to ex-
tract iris patterns from public images. The red channel of
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Figure 2. The effect of target numbers on the false accept rate of
an iris verification system with a threshold set at the EER of the
baseline system. The graph shows the results for the previously
examined CSU face verification system[3] along with the Masek
iris algorithm with score normalisation applied. Both systems ap-
pear to conform to a logarithmic model of system deterioration as
the number of targets increase.
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Figure 3. A comparison of the fitting quality of the normalised
iris algorithm and the baseline. The presence of the lamb subject
in the baseline system produces large step increases in the FAR
undermining the logarithmic plot.
such images could then be used to estimate the similarity of
the iris under the near infrared lighting used in commercial
iris recognition systems[2]. Centralised databases of bio-
metric information are of greater concern. For example, if
the US Visit database were to be hacked into, or worse, pub-
licly released by an activist group, then all of the recorded
biometric information could be used to identify possible tar-
gets for face or fingerprint attacks[19].
4. Conclusions
This paper analyses the effect of targeted attacks, a new
vulnerability that can reduce the effectiveness of automated
and manual identity systems. The paper has evaluated a
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Figure 4. The autocorrelation of the residuals for the logarithmic
model of the Targeted FAR for face and for iris.
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Figure 5. The reduction in FAR as the precision of the target se-
lection is reduced. Imprecision is due to Gaussian noise being
applied to the normalised Hamming distance scores during target
selection.
baseline iris verification algorithm and revealed that tar-
geted attacks can increase false acceptance rates at the EER
of the baseline from 11% to 75% as a result of a single lamb
user. By applying an existing score normalisation technique
this vulnerability can be reduced to an FAR of 31%. The
traditional DET curve evaluation obscures both the vulner-
ability and the importance of the score normalisation coun-
termeasure. Further analysis suggests that the false accep-
tance rate can be estimated using a simple model that is pro-
portional to the logarithm of the number of subjects. This
model provides a means to estimate the vulnerability of sys-
tems with many users.
The analysis outlined in this paper indicates that if large
biometric databases continue to be gathered and such infor-
mation is not properly secured, all biometric systems might
be at risk of targeted attacks. Although significant detail has
been established in the best practice of performing accurate
biometric evaluations, active spoofing attacks have yet to be
formalised[12][4]. As part of the formalisation process, this
paper has highlighted the need for biometric evaluations to
include a targeted false accept measurement as well as the
traditional zero effort attack values in order to get a clearer
indication of the true vulnerability of such systems in real
deployments.
This paper has presented a method of evaluating targeted
attacks by calculating the false acceptance rate for the vari-
ous thresholds associated with the baseline DET curves of a
biometric verification system. However, it should be noted
that the effectiveness of targeted attacks are determined by
both the verification threshold and the number of targets
available to the attacker. The DET curve graphs displayed
in this paper use the full gallery database as a source of tar-
get values. This paper shows how a more general, and more
concise, description of system vulnerability can be obtained
by fitting an a.log(x) + b model to the increase in false
acceptance rate associated with increasing target numbers.
Within this model the value b corresponds to a traditional
zero-effort false accept rate while the value a indicates how
system performance deteriorates as the number of potential
targets increase.
There are a number of areas for further investigation. For
example, it would be valuable to determine the effect of
targeted attacks on state of the art commercial algorithms,
such as those used in the NIST IREX III Evaluation. Future
work could also identify to what extent biometric systems
are vulnerable to targeted attacks when the target is selected
solely using human judgement, as this is the least sophisti-
cated and most straightforward form of attack. It would also
be informative to evaluate the effect of targeted attacks on
other biometrics and other biometric algorithms to deter-
mine whether some features or systems are inherently more
robust to such attacks. Finally, to facilitate further study
into these forms of vulnerability it would be valuable for
open implementations of state of the art biometric systems
to be made available so that more detailed and realistic per-
formance comparisons can be made.
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